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ACTION ACDA-10

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C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 6718

DISTO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD, UR, US

SUBJ: US-SOVIET CW CONSULTATIONS

REF: GENEVA 6626

1. SUMMARY: FOURTH AND FIFTH SESSIONS OF CW CONSULTATIONS
DEVOTED TO FURTHER EXPLORATION OF SCOPE AND TOXICITY STANDARDS
AND TO BEGINNING OF DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION. END SUMMARY.

2. SOVIET AMBASSADOR LIKHACHEV OPENED AUGUST 19 SESSION BY
STATING, IN RESPONSE TO US QUESTION CONCERNING COVERAGE OF FUTURE
DEVELOPMENTS (PARA 5 REFTEL), THAT IN DETERMINING SCOPE OF CW
AGREEMENT SOVIET-PROPOSED MDW AGREEMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT. THUS IF CERTAIN TYPES OF CW AGENTS AND WEAPONS WERE
BANNED BY CW CONVENTION THEY WOULD NOT FALL WITHIN SCOPE OF MDW.
(COMMENT: THIS SOMEWHAT CIRCULAR RESPONSE IS PROBABLY BEST WE
WILL GET FOR MOMENT).

3. SOVIET EXPERT SOKOLSKIY, IN RESPONSE TO US QUESTIONS OF PREVIOUS
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SESSION, SAID SOVIETS CONSIDERED ORAL TOXICITY MEASUREMENTS

DESIRABLE IN VIEW OF LARGE NUMBER OF AGENTS SUITABLE FOR POISONING FOOD AND WATER. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH SOVIETS BELIEVED SINGLE TOXICITY THRESHOLD PROBABLY SUFFICIENT, THEY HAD NOT YET TAKEN POSITIVE

WITH REGARD TO SECOND THRESHOLD PROPOSED BY US AND WOULD WELCOME ELABORATION OF CONCEPT. SOKOLSKIY SAID THAT WHILE SOVIET 1974 DRAFT HAD PROPOSED THRESHOLD OF LCT (50) VALUE OF 1500 MG-MIN PER CUBIC METER, JULY 3 NOTE EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO EXPAND SCOPE TO LCT (50) OF 20,000 AND REFLECTED THEIR VIEW THAT AGREEMENT POSSIBLE AT ANY VALUE BETWEEN 1,500 AND 20,000.

4. WITH RESPECT TO OTHER US QUESTIONS, SOKOLSKIY EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH US VIEW THAT TO DETERMINE RELIABLE TOXICITY VALUES IT IS NECESSARY TO STANDARDIZE THE EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY FOR EACH METHOD OF APPLICATION, SAID THAT FOUR ROUTES OF ENTRY INTO BODY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN SETTING TOXICITY CRITERIA AND STATED SOVIET VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO EXPRESS TOXICITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC TOXICITY VALUES RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF REFERENCE COMPOUNDS.

5. IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET QUESTIONS AMBASSADOR MARTIN STATED THAT, ALTHOUGH NONE OF FOUR APPROACHES TO CW LIMITATIONS OUTLINED BY US IN APRIL 13 SPEECH MENTIONED PROHIBITION ON STOCKPILING, WE AGREED THAT ANY AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE NON-TRANSFER, NON-ACQUISITION CLAUSE OF SOME SORT IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE ACQUISITION BY MEANS OTHER THAN MANUFACTURE. HE ALSO STATED US VIEW THAT STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH NOT DISCRIMINATORY TO STATES WITHOUT CW STOCKS AS SUGGESTED BY SOVIETS, BECAUSE THREAT TO SECURITY OF STATE WHICH HAD MADE DECISION NOT TO ACQUIRE CW STOCKS COULD HARDLY BE INCREASED BY IMPOSITION OF LIMITS ON THOSE STATES HAVING SUCH CAPABILITY.

6. US EXPERTS OPENED AUGUST 20 SESSION WITH RESPONSES TO SOVIET QUESTIONS CONCERNING CREATING OF HOLES IN OZONE LAYER BY CHEMICAL MEANS (NOT CW IN US VIEW), INTERPRETATION OF US SUGGESTIONS ON TOXICITY CRITERIA AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUPER-TOXIC THRESHOLD AND BORDERLINE BETWEEN SINGLE AND DUAL-PURPOSE AGENTS. THEY EXPLAINED

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SUPER-TOXIC THRESHOLD INTENDED AS SUPPLEMENT TO GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION AND THAT ALL COMPOUNDS OF GREATER TOXICITY WOULD HAVE TO BE ASSUMED TO BE SINGLE-PURPOSE AGENTS UNLESS LEGITIMATE PEACEFUL USE COULD BE DEMONSTRATED. IN SUCH CASE SPECIAL CONTROL MEASURES WOULD HAVE TO BE APPLIED. SOVIETS CITED EXAMPLE OF USE OF SUPERTOXIC SUBSTANCE TETRODOTOXIN IN MEDICAL RESEARCH WHICH ILLUSTRATED, IN THEIR VIEW, COMPLEXITY OF PROBLEM AND NEED FOR CAUTIOUS APPROACH.

7. DISCUSSION TURNED TO VERIFICATION PROBLEMS WITH STATEMENT BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR STRESSING THAT VERIFICATION SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AS "PACKAGE" AND WOULD OF COURSE BE FUNCTION OF SCOPE OF AGREEMENT WHICH SOVIETS CONTINUE TO BELIEVE SHOULD BE COMPREHENSIVE. HE REITERATED STANDARD SOVIET CW POSITION THAT FACT OF ADHERENCE SUFFICIENT GUARANTEE THAT STATE WOULD ENSURE COMPLIANCE AND THAT VERIFICATION SHOULD BE BY NATIONAL CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS. HE CITED BWC AS PRECEDENT. LIKHATCHEV REITERATED SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR OPERATION OF A NATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEM CONTAINED IN 1974 SOVIET WORKING PAPER CCD/403. HE SAID SOVIETS PREPARED TO DISCUSS US PROPOSALS CONCERNING VERIFICATION OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION, USE OF WHICH THEY DID NOT EXCLUDE IN CERTAIN CASES, BUT REITERATED NECESSITY OF PACKAGE APPROACH SAYING VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION ONLY PART OF PROBLEM AND CONCENTRATION ON THIS ONE POINT WOULD LEAD DISCUSSIONS AWAY FROM MAJOR PROBLEM OF COMPREHENSIVE PROHIBITION. HE REQUESTED FURTHER ELABORATION OF US IDEAS CONCERNING VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION.

8. AMBASSADOR MARTIN RESPONDED THAT DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION ISSUES WAS MOST IMPORTANT PART OF CURRENT CONSULTATIONS AND THAT US EVALUATION OF THESE CONTACTS WOULD BE DEPENDENT LARGELY ON OUTCOME ON THIS ITEM. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT, IN SPITE OF KNOWN DIFFERENCES OF VIEW, THE SIDES COULD ENGAGE IN FRANK AND OPEN EXCHANGES. US EXPERT (MIKULAK) FOLLOWED WITH PREPARED STATEMENT SUGGESTING THAT DISCUSSION FOCUS ON TECHNICAL VERIFICATION PROCEDURES WHICH COULD BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS, VISITS TO PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND ASSURING THAT PLANTS WERE REMOVED FROM PRODUCTION. HE ALSO SUGGESTED INFORMATION EXCHANGE BE DISCUSSED AND ASKED FOR SOVIET VIEWS ON VERIFICATION PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN VARIOUS US CCD WORKING PAPERS AND STATEMENTS. CATTO

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